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All issues Volume 309 (2020) MATEC Web Conf., 309 (2020) 02012 References
Open Access
Issue
MATEC Web Conf.
Volume 309, 2020
2019 International Conference on Computer Science Communication and Network Security (CSCNS2019)
Article Number 02012
Number of page(s) 7
Section Network Security and Software Design
DOI https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202030902012
Published online 04 March 2020
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