Energy security aspects related to the National Power Grid

National Power Grid is an important element within the National Power System, having in its composition critical infrastructures of national importance without which the national economy could not operate, and its non-operation, totally or partially (black/brown-out), generates energy insecurity, negative factor with devastating and catastrophic effects on industrial, economic and national security. Due to the fact that National Power Grid is of national strategic importance, it has to be assessed and monitored permanently in terms of security risks, in order to identify vulnerabilities, and this need for assessment also comes from the European perspective because Romania is interconnected to ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators) which interconnects various power overhead lines from North to South, from West to East, or even with Africa and Asia. In order to secure the National Power Grid, the authors have set out in this paper to identify possible internal or external vulnerabilities and what impact they have on the National Power Grid and National Power System. By knowing the vulnerabilities, one can automatically identify the dangers and threats to which it is subjected and engaged, being able to develop national/European measures or strategies for the protection and security of the critical infrastructures related to. For this reason, it is considered that the identification of vulnerabilities must become a pressing issue of national, and European energy security and be a useful tool for authorities to develop a energy strategy (short – long term) for the proper functioning of the National Power Grid and the national economy, because all sectors of the economy depend on electricity. The identified vulnerabilities are eliminated by National Energy Strategy 2021 – 2036 (short, medium,and long term) proposed by the authors, with the aim of increasing energy and national security. 1 General information regarding energy security As we know, while we are facing an increase for the cases of energy collapses around the world, although this is manifested by the lack of electricity (phenomenon described by blackout) in industrial and household consumers, makes this paper of great importance and relevance, knowing that there are critical power infrastructure that can be vulnerable to some several internal or even external factors [1-3]. The lack of electricity supply to industrial and * Corresponding author: daniel.fita@yahoo.com © The Authors, published by EDP Sciences. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). MATEC Web of Conferences 342, 04010 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202134204010 UNIVERSITARIA SIMPRO 2021

household consumers leads to national crises that cause a state of societal imbalance causing extreme damage to the safety of citizens, industry, the national economy and thus national security, because all sectors of a national economy depend on electricity. In this context, the National Power System -NPS, through the National Power Grid -NPG, becomes a strategic objective of national importance by generating national and European critical infrastructures, without which the national economy cannot function properly [4][5][6]. Romania's energy security depends on the energy independence in the context of the sustainable development of the European Union, therefore the energetic stability factors must be created by: providing the necessary primary resources (natural gas, oil, coal, uranium, etc.) for the engendering of electricity and therefore limiting the dependence on imports; enlarging provided natural resources considering the import for producing electrical energy and by its ways for the distribution; increasing the adequacy and safety of national transmission networks for electricity and gas outages; protection of the critical infrastructure regarding the physical integrity of energy purposes; securing workplaces and personnel by avoiding and/or stopping technical accidents/ incidents that could lead to disruption of the NPS [7][8][9].
But Romania's energy security is endangered by various elements of instability that may threaten the safety and security of NPG: vulnerabilities (natural and anthropogenic hazards); threats (terrorist acts, political instability, armed conflict and piracy); dangers (lack of supply of raw materials necessary for the production of electricity, use of electricity as a weapon or pressure tool, high costs of electricity, etc.) [10].
In order to stabilize and increase energy security, the NPG must be constantly subject to security assessments to identify vulnerabilities, risks, dangers or threats, in order to prevent, combat or eliminate these sources of instability that may lead to NPS insecurity and general insecurity, and the recommendation is that these identification and evaluation processes be carried out more preventively than corrective [11].

Development region for BUCHAREST -ILFOV:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the area of Bucharest and Ilfov County (South Bucharest -Domnești -West Brazi -Fundeni -South Bucharest).

Development region for NORTH-EAST:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the north-est areas of the North-East region (Gutinaș -Munteni -Iași FAI -Suceava).

Development region for SOUTH -EAST:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the northern part of the South-East region (Lacu Sărat -Filești -Bărboși -West Focșani-Gutinaș).

7.
Development region for SOUTH: Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the central area of the South region (West Brazi -Târgoviște -Bradu -Brașov -Dârste -West Brazi).

Development region for WEST:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the western part of the Western region (Arad -Calea Aradului -Săcălaz -Timișoara).

11.
Development region for WEST: Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the central area of the West region (Arad -Mintia -Timișoara).

Development region for NORTH -EAST:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the northern part of Romania (Suceava -Roșiori) or (Suceava -Gădălin).

Development region for WEST:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the western part of the Western region and Romania (Arad -Timișoara -Reșița -Porțile de Fier).

Development region for NORTH -WEST:
Failure to close the 400 kV ring in the western part of the western region and Romania (South Oradea -Nădab).

LEGEND: Red color: Power Critical Infrastructures (power substation and OHL) for 400 kV; Green color: Power Critical Infrastructures (power substation and OHL) 220 kV.
c) External vulnerabilities within neighbouring power systems with internal impact on NPG, according to the table 7 [15].

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA:
The voltage of 330 kV (atypical EU) which is specific only to IPS (Integrated Power System), which creates dependence on this power system and makes it almost impossible to interconnect to another power system (eg Romanian EEA), without major investments in power infrastructure power stations, overhead power lines and power plants) (power weapon or pressure tool).

UKRAINE:
Total dependence to the IPS (Integrated Power System) Power System of the former Soviet Union countries following components: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan (power weapon or pressure tool).

UKRAINE:
The voltage of 330 to 750 kV (atypical EU) which is peculiar to IPS (Integrated Power System), which creates the dependency on the power system and make it almost impossible for interconnection to other power system (eg EEA Romanian, Slovak, Polish), with major investments in power infrastructure (power stations, overhead power lines and power plants) (power weapon or pressure tool).

Drawing up the National Energy Strategy 2021 -2036
The National Energy Strategy (short, medium and long term) following proposed solutions by the authors to eliminate (combat) the internal or external vulnerabilities of the NPG, according to the table 8.

Conclusions
According to follows of the risk assessment of energy security on critical infrastructure (power substations and power overhead lines) within NPG, we have identified 26 vulnerabilities: 13 internal vulnerabilities with internal impact within NPG, 4 external vulnerabilities with external impact within NPG, and 9 external vulnerabilities within neighbouring power systems with internal impact on NPG. The need to identify vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures in the NPG apparent from the following considerations: knowing the fact that NPG is of national strategic importance, it should be assessed and continuously monitored in terms of security risks in order to identify vulnerabilities, the need for security risk assessment comes from a European perspective because Romania is interconnected ENTSO-E (European Union power system), by knowing the vulnerabilities, we can automatically identify dangers and threats that NPG is subject engaged and create measures or national strategy to protect and secure critical infrastructures national/European, and specific risk scenarios developed a high level of risk with devastating effects on national security.
Energy security vulnerability should be prevented, combated and eliminated through major investments in power infrastructure (power substations, overhead power lines and power plant) and qualified personnel in following activity regarding electrical installation high, very high and ultra high voltage: operational, maneuvers, maintenance, dispatch, occupational health and safety, critical infrastructures protection and emergency or crisis response.